Rwanda is an electoral autocracy that has displayed impressive advancements in women’s empowerment. Rwanda’s historical civil war context is vital to understanding the current mechanisms of its socio-political structure. The nation was devastated by the 1994 genocide, which was marked by a severe gender-based infection targeting Tutsi women (Powley, 2005). In the aftermath of the civil conflict, Rwandan women exhibited great resilience, leading the reconstruction of society as heads of households, builders, and workers (Parmar, 2013). Although feminists in Rwanda face the challenge of bridging the gap between feminist elites and the majority of women at the grassroots level, Rwandan women’s determination and resilience are an inspiration for women’s advocacy movements globally.

The Rwandan government has implemented a variety of gender policies as reflected in legal frameworks, legislative quotas, and the establishment of women’s councils. First, according to UN Women, Rwanda has successfully included gender indicators in 81.8% of its overarching legal frameworks concerning public life: 90% in violence against women, 91.7% in employment and economic benefits, and 81.8% in marriage and family. These legal provisions provide a solid foundation for promoting gender equality in the socioeconomic sectors.

Second, the Rwandan political system has legislated quotas at various levels to increase women’s political representation. Specifically, Article 10 of the country’s constitution allocates 30% of the reserved seats in decision-making organs to women, although it lacks legal sanctions for non-compliance (IDEA, 2023). Rwanda also mandates reserved seats at the subnational level, with a minimum of 30% of all district council members reserved for women (IDEA, 2023). In such ways, Rwanda’s legal system mandates quotas to enhance women’s political representation at various levels of government.

Finally, the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development, the main women’s policy apparatus in Rwanda, established women’s councils to address concerns at the grassroots level. These councils are operated only by women from the smallest administrative units to larger sectors, districts, and provinces (Powley, 2005). As such, Rwanda displays high levels of gender policies in the political, economic, and social spheres, even institutionalizing women’s participation at the grassroots level.

The long history of women’s activism has contributed significantly to Rwanda’s extraordinary advances in gender policy reforms. After the genocide, women’s movements motivated the nation’s reconstruction process. Specifically, a collective of 35 women’s organizations named Pro-Femmes Twese Hamwe (Pro-Women All Together) has worked toward the structural transformation of Rwandan society to establish social justice, equal opportunities, and sustainable peace (Parmar, 2013). The group collaborated with women legislators and the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development to pressure for transformation in the drafting of Rwanda’s new constitution in 2003 (Powley, 2005). As a result, women activists in Rwanda were able to voice criticisms of existing patriarchal structures and generate change in the legal system.

Second, women’s activism in Rwanda is highly inclusive of civil society, as grassroots efforts drive most movements toward gender equality. The threatening conditions created by the genocide and civil war prompted grassroots mobilization among women, leading to the establishment of community organizations, increased engagement with state institutions, and female candidates for government positions (Berry, 2015). Moreover, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and feminist activists in civil society continuously engage and communicate with legal apparatus such as the Ministry of Gender and Women in Development to reflect the interests and needs of women at the grassroots level. Thus, women’s activism in Rwanda is motivated by the efforts of local women.

Finally, women’s activism in Rwanda is highly active and visible both domestically and internationally. Women’s rights NGOs have played a vital role in post-conflict efforts to organize women’s activities, advise the government, and advocate for women’s political participation. Furthermore, women’s activists in Rwanda have gained the international spotlight by collaborating with international organizations, such as the UN, for advocacy campaigns on gender equality and gender-based violence (Karungi, 2023). Women’s activism in Rwanda has been driven by a determination to create a more equitable society by pressuring the state, reflecting the interests of women at the grassroots level, and gaining visibility to domestic and international audiences.

Within this typology, Rwanda is situated at the intersection of high-level state policies and strong women’s activism. Given the government’s focus on gender reforms in conjunction with the critical efforts of women’s movements that pressure the government at the grassroots level, Rwanda displays gender mainstreaming under autocracy with minimal autocratic genderwashing. Indeed, gender mainstreaming has been a key agenda of the ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front as it seeks to address the historical exclusion of women and promote their inclusion in post-genocide recovery and reconstruction (Powley, 2005). Rwanda’s embrace of a gender-sensitive approach in the political, economic, and social sectors suggests a comparative integration of women’s perspectives in decision-making processes, policy formulation, and program implementation.

While Rwanda’s robust political will for gender-sensitive policies and the vibrancy of women’s advocacy movements contribute to gender mainstreaming, it is important to note the various factors that jeopardize such accomplishments. In particular, Rwanda may experience autocratic genderwashing through the formalistic implementation of gender policies, an emphasis on quantitative rather than substantial results, and a decrease in communication between civil society and policymakers (Debusscher & Ansoms, 2013) Thus, while the Rwandan case exemplifies a trend toward gender mainstreaming with minimal autocratic genderwashing, it is important to recognize that the two are not mutually exclusive, especially considering the low transparency and entrenchment of power in non-democratic states.

Saudi Arabia is a closed autocracy governed by an absolute monarchy with a strongly patriarchal structure that discriminates against women in the political, economic, and social spheres. The country upholds a societal structure based on tribal patriarchal values and strict interpretations of Wahhabi Islam, through which men maintain domination over women in the public and private spheres (Alkhaled, 2021). While Saudi Arabia has ratified international human rights conventions, including the CEDAW, discriminatory legal restrictions on women’s rights persist upon justifications provided by Sharia law. Women are strictly prohibited from calling for feminist values and gender equality as the ruling regime heavily controls social media content.

Saudi Arabia has discouraging levels of gender parity within its legal framework. Legislated quotas in the form of reserved seats address women’s representation in the unicameral parliament. Specifically, in accordance with the January 2011 Royal Order, 30 of the 151 seats (20%) of the Consultative Council (Majlis Ash-Shura) were designated for women (IDEA, 2023). However, such quotas are not conjoined with legal sanctions for non-compliance or rank placement regulations. Furthermore, the legislature lacks provisions for direct public funding to political parties related to gender equality among candidates. In 2015, women gained the right to contest seats and participated as voters in the municipal elections for the first time (IDEA, 2023). However, the decree prohibited female candidates from publishing their pictures in campaign materials based on Saudi Arabia’s societal principles. Saudi Arabia has also implemented minimal legal frameworks to address gender equality in the economic and social sectors.

Despite the harsh conditions that women face in Saudi Arabia, women’s activism continues to bring about slow but steady transformations toward gender equality. First, Saudi women differ in their degree of criticism toward the regime, depending on their political orientations. Specifically, liberal (libralliyya) and rights-based (huquqiyya) groups advocate for the increased participation of women in public life and explicitly address women’s rights issues in reference to international human rights norms (Dabbagh, 2015). While some groups may cooperate with the government to bring about change from within, many liberal and rights-based advocacy networks strive to exert pressure on the regime for gender reforms.

Additionally, the purposeful disuse of an explicitly feminist agenda is a key characteristic of women’s activism. Instead of the term ‘feminist’ (nasawiyya), alternative descriptors such as women or female (nisa’iyya) are preferred by women’s organizations (Dabbagh, 2015). The strategic employment of language allows women activists to maintain independence from state control and foreign influences. Women’s organizations are also critical of the dominant Western representation of Saudi Arabian women as oppressed or victims, as such misconceptions hinder the legitimacy of Saudi women’s groups seeking authentic liberation projects (Dabbagh, 2015). In such ways, women’s activism in Saudi Arabia engages in critical discussions that challenge the regime and the existing system.

Second, women’s activism in Saudi Arabia is motivated by grassroots efforts that are largely established through online platforms and petitions. To navigate the restrictions imposed by the government, women’s rights organizations operate primarily through digital channels such as blogs, reports, and campaigns. While the Basic Law of Governance enables citizens to petition the king, Saudi women’s rights activists leverage technology, such as WhatsApp and Telegram groups, to connect like-minded individuals and form advocacy networks at the civil level (Tønnessen, 2016). Moreover, Saudi women skillfully utilize their entrepreneurial space as legitimate platforms for social transformation. Such practices of activism evolved from the local level, instigated by female entrepreneurs who sought to empower women within their respective organizations, provided a foundation for the development of feminist consciousness, and encouraged political activists (Alkhaled, 2021). In this sense, women’s activism in Saudi Arabia is deeply rooted in grassroots efforts, mobilized through online platforms, petitions, and the entrepreneurial space.

Finally, women’s activism in Saudi Arabia has increasingly gained visibility both domestically and internationally through bold acts of defiance and strategic use of social media platforms. For example, a network of activists established the “Women2Drive” movement in 2011, an online campaign to challenge the regime’s ban on women’s right to drive (Alkhaled, 2021). The participants were arrested and detained, but the protest succeeded in generating a powerful statement and international awareness for Saudi women’s rights. The visibility and impact of this protest eventually led to the establishment of women’s right to drive in 2017. The efforts of the women’s movements have resonated with a growing number of women’s rights activists opposing the male guardianship system and various discriminatory practices in the country’s political and social systems.

Saudi Arabia contextualizes gender within the complex relationship between a repressive regime and active women’s mobilization. The Saudi Arabian state takes minimal action on institutionalizing gender-sensitive issues, responding to the most impactful petitions and protests by female activists. This indicates that an autocratic state’s active interest is a precondition for autocratic genderwashing. Hence, autocratic genderwashing is generally absent or ineffective in Saudi Arabia, as its ruling power does not employ gender policies as a strategy. Rather, the state reinforces the structures of oppression targeted at women.

However, Saudi Arabia’s leadership may have prospective incentives to implement gender policies. Under Saudi Vision 2030 and Saudi First Nationalism, the government must secure women’s support and contributions to maintain the monarch’s leadership (Eum, 2019). The emergence of women as visible participants in both the public and private sphere may prompt the regime to redefine and reconstruct women’s roles in society. If grassroot-level women’s movements choose to cooperate with the government under such changes, Saudi Arabia will not be exempt from autocratic genderwashing.

Venezuela is an electoral autocracy with a complex political landscape that has undergone several transitions to democracy. When Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías took over in 1998, a key aspect of his political campaign was the inclusion and mobilization of women (Rakowski & Espina, 2010). Despite progress on gender issues under the rule of Hugo Chávez, Venezuela’s severe economic crisis and political repression under President Nicholas Maduro has caused a deterioration in social rights, which encompass women’s rights (Cheatham, Roy, & Labrador, 2023). In particular, Venezuela’s migration issue has raised concerns of sexual violence against women, such as trafficking (UN OHCHR, 2023). As such, gender dynamics in Venezuela have been shaped by the interplay of political transitions and legislative reforms.

Venezuela has implemented various gender policies to promote women’s political representation at both national and subnational levels. In the National Assembly, 37 out of 167 seats in the National Assembly are held by women, accounting for 22% of the total seats (IDEA, 2023). Particularly, Venezuela’s legislative candidate system employs the zebra system, which alternates between men and women to ensure a gender balance (IDEA, 2023). Similarly, at the subnational level, gender quotas ensure women’s participation in regional legislative, metropolitan, and district councils, as candidacies must achieve gender parity of 50% (IDEA, 2023). Such gender policies demonstrate the Venezuelan government’s commitment to promoting women’s political representation and prioritizing gender balance in political candidate elections.

Moreover, the integration of women into the economic and social infrastructure has been a key component of Venezuela’s policy reforms, beginning with Chávez’s rule. Particularly, the institutionalization of Venezuela’s National Institute of Women (Inamujer) and Women’s Development Bank (Banmujer) to service rural women’s credit issues were important components of “Chavista populism,” or “Chavismo” (Deere, 2017), As such, Venezuela exhibits a legacy of promoting women’s involvement in the economic and social sectors, as well as the political realm.

Women activism in Venezuela has faced significant challenges in recent years. On contributory factor is co-optation, as the beginnings of women’s activism in Venezuela were primarily under President Hugo Chávez’s guidance (Fernandes, 2007). While women’s activism has successfully diverted gender roles and collectivized private tasks, movements coexist with more vertical and populist forms of politics within official sectors of Chavismo, limiting the autonomy and impact of women’s advocates (Fernandes, 2007). In this way, women’s activism in Venezuela has had a relatively close association with the workings of the state, particularly under Chávez’s populist politics.

Second, grassroot advocacy movements for women’s rights have been declining rapidly under the current repressive regime. Indeed, Venezuela has had a long history since 1936 of grassroots-oriented activism led by educated, politically active women, which has continued to form coalitions among women in civil society and elite politicians throughout the mid-1970s and 1980s (Rakowski & Espina, 2010). However, the local women’s movement in rural areas is relatively lacking in autonomy and impact, unable to yield tangible outcomes even under the progressive land rights for women that the Venezuelan government implemented (Deere, 2017). Moreover, the nationwide economic crisis and transition in political power have hampered the once robust women’s movements at the grassroots level.

Finally, visibility poses difficulties for women’s activism in Venezuela. While the Chávez presidency initially offered new political opportunities and mobilization for women’s rights, such efforts gradually resulted in new class divisions and politicization of the national women’s agency, which hindered the formation of broad coalitions across classes and political parties. The rupture and growing hostility between the National Institute of Women (Inamujer) and non-Chavista civil society groups further exacerbated the decline in mobilization (Rakowski & Espina, 2010). Such factors indicate that the previously strong women’s activism in Venezuela has deteriorated over the past decade, with weak grassroots efforts, and a lack of visibility.

Within this analytical typology, Venezuela is located at the junction of relatively high-level gender policies and weak women activism. Under such conditions, autocratic states are most prone to autocratic genderwashing, in which the regime strategically employs gender policies to legitimize power. In the case of Venezuela, Chavismo politics and the ruler’s constructed image as the ‘liberator of women’ seemingly induced progressive change toward gender equality, when in actuality, militaristic and masculine discourse dominated the political sphere. Specifically, despite the increased engagement of ordinary women in grassroots politics, many community leaders are men, and the social programs initiated by Chávez remain largely facilitated by male-dominated bureaucracies (Fernandes, 2007). Through the strategic use of gender policies, Chávez successfully gained popularity and political support among women. This populist trend positioned Venezuelan women in a “conundrum,” which further entrenched the autocratic regime.

Although Venezuelan women’s advocacy efforts were key to transitions throughout the country’s political history, the change in authority, economic crisis, and conflicts among women’s organizations have severed grassroots activism from meaningful gender equality. The current absence of visible grassroots networks leaves Venezuela even more vulnerable to autocratic genderwashing, as women activists are unable to raise criticism and exert pressure on the state to consider women’s rights and interests. As the Venezuelan case exemplifies, autocratic genderwashing is most likely in contexts with high levels of state initiative toward gender policies and relatively weak grassroots movements.

Gender within the context of socialist China, a closed autocracy, is shaped by diverse factors affecting the discourse and realities of women’s rights. The official discourse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on women’s liberation, which advocates gender equality in education and economic opportunities, draws on the May Fourth Feminist Movement, Marxist theories of revolution and early twentieth-century nationalism (Zheng, 1997). Additionally, the All-China Women’s Federation is the main apparatus that motivates women’s rights policies and procedures in conjunction with the CCP. While advances have been made in recognizing gender as a social category, challenges remain in reconciling traditional and modern notions of femininity and ensuring meaningful empowerment for Chinese women.

China’s gender policy is characterized by a relatively low representation of women in political positions and limited implementation of legislated quotas. The National People’s Congress (NPC), or the Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui has a legislated quota system comprising 27% of reserved seats for women (IDEA, 2023). Specifically, according to a decision made by the 10^th NPC in 2007, a proportion of not less than 22% of the deputies should be women (IDEA, 2023). However, only 3.23% in ministerial positions are women (World Economic Forum, 2022). Finally, China lacks legal frameworks to support equal rights in education and health for women (World Economic Forum, 2022). As such, a low level of gender policy is observed in the case of China.

Women’s activism in China faces significant challenges and limitations related to co-optation, weak grassroots activities, and poor visibility. First, most women’s organizations in China are managed in collaboration with the political agenda of the CCP. The numerous women’s NGOs in China that have evolved since the 1990s have emerged from the state body of the All-China Women’s Federation and face constraints that prevent them from effectively criticizing existing gender power hierarchies within the political structure. Similarly, women’s organizations in China are subject to strict control by the Chinese government and are unable to voice direct criticism of the CCP’s decisions. For example, while preparing for the Fourth World Conference on Women of 1995 in Beijing, Chinese government officials directed Chinese female panelists and experts to avoid politically sensitive issues and emphasize the accomplishments of Chinese women under the CCP (Zheng, 1996). As such, women’s activism employs co-optation strategies, having to follow the CCP’s set narratives on gender.

Second, grassroot feminist movements in China are restricted by strict censorship and state surveillance. Activists have turned to digital platforms and have engaged in “digital masquerading” to circumvent censorship and represent women’s bodies in public spaces (Tan, 2017). However, grassroots efforts on online platforms also face limitations because of the social stigmatization of feminism (Mao, 2020). Lastly, the issue of strict censorship directly links to the minimal visibility of women’s activism in the domestic and international context. While online platforms such as Weibo have provided space for politicizing women’s private matters, much of women’s activism in China still lacks visibility significant enough to induce substantial advances of local women’s interests (Hou, 2020). As such, women’s activism in China has yet to gain momentum for significant political and social impact.

Within the proposed framework, China posits the joint effect of comparatively low-level gender policies and weak women’s activism. Under such conditions, China shows minimal inclination toward either gender mainstreaming or genderwashing. Under its socialist ideology, the CCP emphasizes women’s equal rights to labor and economic participation. However, the Chinese government’s discourse on gender does not address the patriarchal structures that cause the subordination and marginalization of women. Moreover, the state does not offer legal systems that reflect women’s rights to political participation, domestic care work, education, and health. As the Chinese state dictates the gender narrative according to socialist values rather than international standards, it is difficult to determine whether autocratic genderwashing applies to China’s case as in other autocracies, especially as a legitimization strategy to gain international prestige.