Studies developed according to an individual-level analysis tried to demonstrate the key determinants giving rise to an individual North Korean’s willingness to defect and those that generate an opportunity to leave North Korea. Individual willingness is attributed to economic and political factors (Haggard & Noland, 2010; Kim, 2003; Kim, 2010). The underlying assumption of this approach is that the most crucial factors determining an individual’s living standards are economic and political. In terms of economic factors, an individual who can consistently earn a living from her/his workplace and can obtain sufficient food does not have a strong incentive to leave her/his own country. In terms of political factors, an individual who enjoys freedom and safety from government intrusion does not commit to abandoning her/his country. Thus, we can predict that the interplay between poverty, hunger, and political persecution will reinforce an individual North Korean’s willingness to defect from her/his own country.

Not every individual who is willing to leave North Korea is able to do so. Those who attempt to defect are setting out on one of the most arduous journeys in the world (Chang, 2006; Kim, 2003; Lankov, 2006). Along with willingness, the individual-level opportunity to defect is a necessary condition for illegal migration from North Korea. One of the most influential determinants concerning the opportunity to defect is where an individual resides. According to an investigation by the South Korean government, about 70% of all North Korean defectors came from Yanggang or Hamgyong Province (Korean Ministry of Unification, 2017). These two provinces lie in the northeast part of North Korea, along the border with China. Additionally, border controls between North Korea and China are more relaxed than border controls between North Korea and South Korea. As a result, people who live in the two provinces along the Chinese border have a better opportunity to defect.

Besides the residential factor, several conditions enhancing opportunities to defect can be suggested. The first is overseas employment. More than 100,000 North Korean laborers are working abroad, and they have more opportunity to defect from North Korean government control than the individuals living in North Korea (Lee, 2016). The second factor is money. The individual needs to bribe North Korean border guards with considerable sums to cross the border between North Korea and China (Park, 2017). The final condition shaping a favorable opportunity to defect is a network of family members or friends in China and South Korea (Kang, 2017). The family members and friends outside North Korea provide the money required for defection and help the defectors to settle in South Korea.

Previous studies concentrating on individual-level willingness and opportunity contribute to understanding the causes of North Korean defection, but they rarely account for why illegal migration is dominated by female North Koreans. The studies examining the individual-level factors cannot generate an answer to the question of why women’s willingness to defect is reinforced more than that of men. Moreover, the previous studies do not clearly explain why North Korean women have more opportunities to defect than men.

One of the strengths of the explanations based on the structural level is that they take into consideration both the domestic circumstances of North Korea and the international environment. The main framework of social-level studies addressing the causes of North Korean defection consists of push and pull factors (Lee, 1966). The studies conducted with the sociopolitical lenses explore the domestic and international forces that push and pull the North Koreans toward one of the most dangerous pathways to defection.

One group of studies on the social level concentrates more on the forces that originate within North Korea and drive people out (Bidet, 2009; Chang, 2006). The catastrophic food shortages and economic crisis in the 1990s played an important role in pushing the North Koreans into China and South Korea. The economic downturn undermined the state’s control over its population, and in turn, the weakening of state power made it easier for the North Korean population to commit to deviant acts, such as illegal migration.

Another group of studies with the social-level focused on the pulling forces that exist outside of North Korea (Chang, 2006; Lankov, 2004). If the defection did not offer better political and economic conditions, it would not likely to happen. Successful illegal migration allows the defectors to live in a better economic and political environment. The South Korean government helps the defectors get a job and supports them in settling down by providing a sizable supplementary living allowance. Furthermore, under South Korean rule, North Korean defectors are able to enjoy political freedom and need not be concerned about government intrusion. The better economic and political conditions outside of North Korea tend to lure North Koreans away. An additional force mentioned as attractive to the North Korean population is the degree of commitment toward controlling the border between North Korea and China. Historically, North Korea and China have sustained a mutually favorable relationship and retained relatively relaxed border controls (Kim, 2010). Recently, the North Korean government took measures to strengthen the border control system. While strict controls on this border decrease the chances of successful defection, loose controls on the same border play an important role in pulling the North Korean population out of the country.

The social-level studies pay a special attention to the push and pull forces existing inside and outside of North Korea. While domestic difficulties engendered by a serious economic downturn and political repression serve to drive the North Korean population out of its own country, the better economic conditions beyond the border and the relaxed border regulations tend to pull people out of North Korea. Like the individual-level analysis, the studies adopting a social-level perspective have several limitations in terms of suggesting an adequate explanation for illegal migration that is dominated by female North Koreans. We are not arguing that discrimination and inequality involving gender are minor issues in North Korean society. The relatively static North Korean society, however, cannot be involved in the dynamic gender imbalance involved in the North Korean defections. Furthermore, it cannot be concluded that South Korean society is more attractive to female defectors than to male defectors (Bidet, 2009; Kim & Noh, 2014).

So far, we have reviewed the prior studies exploring the causes of North Korean defections. The studies based on individual-level and social-level analysis reasonably hypothesize about the causes of North Korean defections, and numerous empirical results confirm the propositions. However, previous studies cannot offer a clear answer as to why North Korean women are more likely to defect than North Korean men and why the gender imbalance of the North Korean defection has increased. The main purpose of this study is to provide an account on the systematic mechanism regarding the dynamics of gendered defection from North Koreans.

One of the main functions of the KWP is to support the North Korean government’s rule and secure the survival of the Kim regime. The economic crisis of the 1990s crippled the KWP. The North Korean government required an organization that would help the KWP restore social order and the political stability of Kim’s autocratic rule. The Korean People’s Army (KPA) was chosen by Kim Jong-Il to resolve the nationwide crisis. Thus, the North Korean government adopted the Military-First Policy (Woo, 2014).

As the armed forces of the KWP and the security detail of an autocratic political leader, the KPA was more committed to promoting the KWP’s policy and preserving Kim’s power than to defending the national interest (Korean Workers’ Party Platform, Article 46). When the KWP was crippled by the serious economic downturn, Kim Jong-Il tried to restore his autocratic social order by utilizing this relatively well-disciplined organization. In addition to political functions, economic and social tasks were also imposed on the KPA. Under the Military-First Policy, the North Korean government, through the mass media, introduced military troops as the paragon of a unique North Korean ideology emphasizing self-reliance (juche), in pursuit of restoring social order. Furthermore, numerous military troops were dispatched to construction sites, collective farms, and industrial facilities to compensate for the labor shortage (Vorontrov, 2006). Historically, North Korea has maintained massive armed forces to maintain a military advantage against South Korea. Now the KPA began to require more military personnel because of the social and economic role it was assigned by the North Korean government conducting the Military-First Policy.

With enhanced social and economic missions to implement, the KPA now faced a troop shortage. The great famine in the mid-1990s resulted in a population decrease in those of an age to be drafted, and the cohort born from the mid-1980s to 2000 was physically weaker than that of older generations (Goodkind & West, 2001). To solve the shortage of eligible conscripts, the North Korean government drastically lowered the physical requirements for the draft and prolonged the duration of military service. The KPA lowered the minimum physical requirements in 1994 from a height of 4.9 feet and a weight of 106 pounds to a height of 4.6 feet and a weight of 95 pounds. Furthermore, the North Korean government proclaimed a new military service act requiring 10 years duration of military service from every man drafted in 2003; previously it had been five to eight years (Institute for Unification Education, 2015). As a result, more young males in North Korea remained under the KPA’s control for longer periods.

The reinforced military draft system of North Korea reduces men’s mobility compared to that of women. More than 90% of North Korean males in their 20s are under the rigid control of the KPA, and their mobility is strictly regulated (Jung & Choi, 2007; Lee & Hong, 2011). Although the North Korean government promulgated a military draft law for female service in 2003, the duration of women’s military service is reportedly shorter than men’s and military service is not compulsory for every woman. For the time that North Korean males are under the KPA’s control, females have the relative advantage of being able to move around more freely. Males’ relative lack of mobility compared to females is not necessarily translated into the females’ absolute advantage in mobility. It can be assumed that economic reforms implemented by the government created conditions sufficient for North Korean women with a relative advantage in mobility to defect.

The North Korean government’s efforts to overcome the food shortage and economic downturn in the 1990s focused on two strategies. The first was to attract foreign investment capital in several special economic zones designated by the government (Lim & Lim, 2006). In the first years of the 21st century, the North Korean government designated two cities in which foreign capital was permitted to conduct profit-driven activities. Sinuiju, a northern city bordering China, was selected as a region where Chinese investments could be made. The Chinese government, however, opposed North Korean efforts to attract Chinese investment, and this economic project was abandoned in 2002. Kaesong, a North Korean city bordering South Korea, was also designated a special region where industrial facilities funded by the South Korean investment were permitted to operate. Although this joint project of North and South Korea made money for a time, the South Korean government cancelled it in response to North Korean nuclear and missile tests in 2016.

While the first economic strategy of the North Korean government failed, the second strategy, utilizing capitalist market operations, is considered to be a success (Eberstadt, 2009; Lankov, 2009b; Yang, 2010). In 2002, the North Korean government relaxed the economic policy by which it regulates production and consumption on the national level and strictly prohibits businesses run by private owners. Small businesses producing and selling daily necessities were allowed and commodity markets were legalized by the “Economic Management Improvement Measure.” Even though excessive marketization––which ran counter to the central elements of a socialist economy––engendered a reversion to the previous planned economy and a reform of the currency, the North Korean government still sustains the policy that legalizes the commodity market and allows small private businesses.

North Korean females, previously regarded as “revolutionary mothers of the socialist state,” are playing a leading role in the process of marketization. Numerous studies argue that North Korean women suffer from gender inequality at home and in the workplace, and bear the dual burden imposed by the roles of mother and worker (Kang, 2013; Lee, 2005; Ryang, 2000). A long-standing Confucian tradition and a patriarchal social agenda politically manipulated by autocratic rule are highlighted as factors marginalizing North Korean females and bringing about pervasive sexual discrimination. Nonetheless, North Korean women have come to dominate the commodity market legalized by the government.

The considerable research into the North Korean commodity market reports that more than 70% of traders in the markets are female (Haggard & Noland, 2011; Lim, 2005; Park, 2011; Schwekendiek & Mercier, 2016). The increased presence of women in the process of marketization stems from a wage problem. North Korean females became victimized by the government’s industrial and labor policies, which were implemented to solve the problem of wages. When the economic downturn intensified in the 1990s, almost all state-owned enterprises stopped manufacturing, and the payment of wages was delayed. To resolve the crisis, the North Korean government took an action disadvantageous to women: selective shutdown of the industrial facilities (Ahn, 2001; Lee, 2004; Shim, 2006). While many heavy industries were able to avoid being shut down, almost all plants producing consumer products, such as daily necessities, were closed by the government. The workforce in light industries consisted largely of females, and thus the government’s policy of shutting down industrial facilities generated a mass gender-imbalanced dismissal. Moreover, North Korean women, rather than men became the main target of layoffs (Haggard & Noland, 2011; Hwang, 2000). The government, which wanted males to be the breadwinners in their families, was more reluctant to fire males than females, and it bolstered the propaganda emphasizing women’s role in the family. Unexpectedly, the selective shutdown of industrial facilities and the government’s desired roles for men gave women a better chance to play a leading role in the process of marketization in North Korea. While the men were expected to show up regularly in their workplaces, laid-off women came to trade in the market without workplace obligations.

Female dominance in North Korean markets makes conditions more favorable for women to defect than men. In the process of illegal migration from North Korea, considerable sums of money are reportedly required for bribing the border guards and paying the guide. Feminized marketization provides women with a better opportunity to defect, and the rise of marketization facilitates the gender imbalance in the number of North Korean defection.

The necessary conditions of North Korean defection consist of mobility and capital; the absence of either of these elements significantly decreases the chances of successful defection. Even a North Korean who can move freely is not likely to reach safe haven in South Korea without possessing considerable capital. Moreover, a North Korean who possesses considerable capital is not likely to cross the border between North Korea and China without mobility. Only North Koreans, who can meet both conditions, are likely to cross the border and successfully settle in South Korea. Two policies prompted by the great famine and economic crisis in the 1990s brought about unexpected results that facilitated North Korean females’ mobility and let them amass capital; eventually, the policies led to the gendered illegal migration to South Korea.

If only one of the two policies is implemented, the gender-imbalanced defection by the North Koreans would not occur. If the North Korean government reinforced only the male-targeted military draft system without relaxing the socialist economic regulations, the feminization of marketization would not have occurred and females would not have found a better opportunity to accumulate capital. A strict military draft system targeting males makes North Korean females far more mobile than males, but we cannot conclude that this is the sole cause for the gendered North Korean defection. Crossing the border and entering South Korea reportedly requires substantial capital. Therefore, females with mobility but without capital are not likely to defect successfully. Moreover, the rise of marketization without an enhanced military draft system would never result in the feminization in defection. The economic reforms pursued by the North Korean government evidently provide many more opportunities to accrue profits in commodity markets. Although the number of individuals possessing considerable capital has increased, the gender imbalance in the number of the North Korean defection could not occur without a relative advantage in mobility. Furthermore, without an enhanced military draft system, North Korean males, rather than females, could be expected to play a leading role in marketization.

The gendered North Korean defection stems from the interplay between the male-targeted military draft system and female-dominated marketization. To cope with the great famine and economic crisis of the 1990s, the North Korean government adopted the Military-First Policy and economic reforms. The KPA was chosen to prop up the weakened KWP, and the government lowered the requirements for military conscripts. The collapse of the public food-distribution system forced the North Korean government to legalize small private businesses. The expanding conscription of male and the rise of marketization resulted in North Korean females’ relative advantage in mobility and earning money, and consequently we encounter the phenomena of the gendered North Korean defection.