This section analyzes the pattern of TCM’s political rise. In so doing, I will compare the case of TCM with those of other female leaders that I previously observed in my earlier research. The first step is to understand her individual capital. I have used the concept of ‘individual capital’ in my earlier research on female political leaders (Dewi, 2015a), which refers to the personal traits of each individual in terms of family background, education, skills, personality, and political experiences, which are intrinsic and cannot be transferred.

TCM, who is Hakka, was born on 27 February 1972 in Singkawang; she is a part of the Tjai clan and the third of four girls in her family. She believes in Confucianism, although her identity card states she is a Buddhist. Since her youth, she has been active in PERMASIS or the Singkawang Community Association (Perkumpulan Masyarakat Singkawang). There is little information about her husband, Lim Hok Nen, though some say he is a businessman. TCM is a mother of four children and they also have three step-children. TCM has good individual capital. She gained a Bachelor’s degree from Stie Mulia University in Singkawang in 2011 and has worked in a succession of private companies from 2002 to 2014, the most recent being an insurance company.

TCM has developed strong social networks as a result of her involvement with various organizations, such as participating as a volunteer at the Tzu Chi Foundation as from 2010 to present, actively participating at Tri Dharma serving as the chief of Majelis Tao Indonesia (2014–2019), and also serving as the chief of the Hakka Community of Singkawang (2014–2019) (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017; Profil Tjhai Chui Mie, 2017). TCM’s identity as a part of the Tjai clan (in Indonesian usually written Chai) and the Hakka can be seen from the congratulations posters sent by both the Tjai clan and the Hakka group from Yogyakarta to TCM, which I found in front of the Singkawang Mayor’s Office on 19 December 2017, two days after TCM’s inauguration.

In my interview with TCM in Singkawang, she said that she had the support of her husband and other family members which confirmed her in her decision to compete in the election (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017). She also explained the influential role of her father. Her father, who can neither write nor read Indonesian properly, is the neighborhood chief (ketua Rukun Tetangga) in the Ward of Sedau in the District of South Singkawang. From the time she was a Junior High School student, TCM has been familiar with her father’s role as the neighborhood chief. According to Chan’s research note (2009), the Hakkas of Singkawang have retained their language for generations in spite of the New Order repression; Hakka, not Bahasa Indonesia, was the main language of conversation among the local Chinese. Because TCM is very fluent in Bahasa Indonesia, she often helped her father and others in the surrounding neighborhood who could not speak Bahasa Indonesia well to deal with various matters relating to basic community services such as birth certificates and resident cards. As a result, she gradually came into increasing the touch with the community and gained their trust, and also developed an understanding of the flow of services related to government and administration.

TCM’s initial participation in politics began in 2004 when she replaced Bong Wui Khong from the New Indonesian Association Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru, PPIB) as a member of the Regional House of Representatives of Singkawang. In the 2009 general election, she was successfully elected for PPIB as a female member of the Regional House of Representatives of Singkawang (2009–2014) with the highest vote of all the candidates in her West Singkawang electoral district. This achievement saw her appointed chief of the Regional House of Representatives of Singkawang (2009–2014). Following the elimination of PPIB in the 2014 election, she joined PDI-P, was successfully re-elected as a member of the Regional House of Representatives of Singkawang (2014–2019), and then competed in a direct local election for Mayor of Singkawang in February 2017.

There were four pairs of candidates in the February 2017 direct election in Singkawang: (i) Tjhai Nyit Khim & H. Suriyadi, (ii) TCM & Irwan, (iii) H. Abdul Mutalib & Muhammadin, and (iv) Andi Syarif & H. Nurmansyah, this last pair being nominated by non-political party/independent candidates. According to the General Elections Commission, TCM and Irwan gained the highest number of votes with 42.6% and become the elected Mayor and Deputy Mayor of Singkawang (Yulika, 2017).

Figure 1. 
Congratulations posters from the Tjai clan and Hakka community. Adapted from the author’s picture, in front of Singkawang Mayor’s Office, 19 December 2017.

Interestingly, there were two Chinese Indonesian women competing in the 2017 direct local election in Singkawang, Tjhai Nyit Khim (who was called Malika in the election) and TCM. Both of them come from the same Thjai clan and ran as candidates for the position of Mayor of Singkawang. Tjhai Nyit Khim, who converted to Islam, is the wife of Awang Ishak, former Mayor of Singkawang (2001–2007, 2012–2017). However, as Tjhai Nyit Khim has converted to Islam and become a Muslim, she is no longer considered Chinese. According to local Chinese perceptions and belief, any Chinese who convert to Islam become Malay (Author’s interview with EL, head of South Singkawang sub-district, 20 December 2017). This is also the case among Dayaks. As explained by HK former Mayor of Singkawang (2007–2012), the Chinese or Dayaks (usually Christian) who convert to Islam will be seen as having become Malay or, in the local term, “masuk melayu” (author’s interview with HK, former Mayor of Singkawang (2007–2012) in Jakarta on 7 December 2017). Therefore, in Tjhai Nyit Khim’s case, Chinese communities no longer view Khim as a Chinese Indonesian but a Malay (Melayu). Thus, TCM was considered by the community as the only Chinese woman candidate in the election, a situation that gave her a significant advantage. When I asked her about her motivation to compete in the 2017 election, she said

It seems [that I] just go with the flow. I didn’t want to be involved in politics in 2014. I chatted with some people close to me. But, they were angry with me. [they said] “you were not total [in politics], you have been trusted by the people, you have to help the community” […] They told me to become mayor and indeed I had the encouragement of our party chairman [PDI-P], and the governor [West Kalimantan] at that time because I was the chairman of the local parliament of Singkawang, where I gained the highest number of votes in two legislative elections in Singkawang (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017).

According to TCM, her nomination in the February 2017 direct local election was primarily supported by the chief of the PDI-P of West Kalimantan Province, Cornelis, who also served as the Governor of West Kalimantan for two terms (2008–2013, 2013–2018). As the most powerful figure in West Kalimantan, gaining support from Cornelis made TCM feel confident as the governor said that the party’s machine would ensure her victory. In addition, TCM was supported by HK, the first Chinese Indonesian man elected as Mayor of Singkawang (2007–2012). As TCM said, HK is one of her most prominent campaigners (juru kampanye) (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017).

Without the endorsement of such a powerful patron, it is unlikely TCM would have been confident in her ability to succeed in Singkawang. Cornelis and TCM had strong ties through the political networks as Cornelis had been the chief of the West Kalimantan Province PDI-P and Governor of West Kalimantan for two terms (2008–2013, 2013–2018). In addition, there was the traditional ethnic identity relationship between Dayak (Cornelis) and Chinese (TCM) which had historically seen the existence of a Dayak–Chinese collaboration in West Kalimantan (an issue explained in more detail in a later section). To a lesser degree, we cannot ignore the important presence and endorsement of HK as an important patron as a factor in TCM’s political rise in Singkawang, because HK was the first Chinese Mayor of Singkawang (2007–2012). While the issue still requires further study, these early findings echo Aspinall’s observation (2011, p. 307) that patronage trumps ethnicity in Indonesian local politics: “Although ethnicity is politically relevant in most regions, most detailed local studies suggest that it does not provide the ideological and organizational framework that structures local political dynamics”; in fact, patronage and clientelism are the most consequential frameworks.

Looking at the above story, TCM’s political rise was preceded by her political career as a member of the local parliament. She began her political career as a member of the Regional House of Representatives of Singkawang for three consecutive terms (2004–2009, 2009–2014, 2014–2019), thus confirming her political and social popularity and acceptability among the Singkawang community. Having spent at least 13 years engaging in political activities in the local parliament prior to becoming the Mayor of Singkawang gave her a competitive advantage that made her unbeatable by other politicians. TCM said: “It is impossible to rise suddenly. How will people know our potential? How will they judge whether you have a potential working capability or not if you never show it? That is the point” (Radio Republik Indonesia, 2017).

Looking at the bigger picture, the pattern of TCM’s political rise is similar to those of non-Chinese Indonesian female political leaders in my earlier studies. Female political leaders, before being nominated as candidates for head of local government, had usually been elected as a member of the local parliament for at least one term, but most of them had been elected for two terms. This strategy is congruent with the need to increase popularity within popular direct democracy in local politics. Although some female politicians lose, they will still gain an advantage because their names will have been widely circulated among community members. If they manage to be elected as a member of the local parliament for at least two terms, it provides them with opportunities to prove their capability to their constituents. This is the case, for example, for female political leaders in Java, such as Rustriningsih (district head of Kebumen 2005–2010) who was elected a member of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) in the 1999 general election from the PDI-P’s electoral district of Kebumen (Dewi, 2015a); Ratna Ani Lestari, the elected district head of Banyuwangi (2005–2010), who began her political career as an elected member of the Regional House of Representatives of Jembrana (2004–2009) (Dewi, 2015a); and Sri Sumarni, the elected district head of Grobogan (2015–2010), who was previously elected as the member of the Regional House of Representatives of Grobogan for three consecutive terms (2004–2009, 2009–2014, 2014–2019) where she became the chief of the Regional House of Representatives of Grobogan for the 2009–2014 period (Dewi & Kusumaningtyas, 2018). In Bali, we see Ni Putu Eka Wiryastuti, the elected district head of Tabanan, Bali (2010–2015, 2015–2020), who were former members of the Tabanan Regional House of Representatives (2009–2014) (Dewi, 2016). In South Sulawesi we can see Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, elected a member of the Regional House of Representatives of Gowa from Golkar for two periods (i.e., 2004–2009 and 2009–2014), who later run as the candidate of district head of Gowa though did not gain enough votes to be elected as district head of Gowa in the 2015 direct local election (Dewi, 2018). In sum, their successes in local parliaments prove their real popularity and acceptability among local people, which is an important consideration for politicians wishing to run as candidates for head of local government.

TCM has strong social capital due to the networks she developed with various groups in Singkawang. In this regard, I agree with Burt (1995) who believes that social capital is the major determinant for success in a competition. In the case of TCM, she acknowledged her strong social capital

My advantage lies in the fact that I make friends with various people and don’t discriminate, even when I was a member of the local parliament […]. (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017).

A further interview with a prominent Tri Dharma figure in Singkawang (a Chinese Indonesian man who identified himself as Hokkian) saw similar comments

This is our pride [Chinese Indonesians in Singkawang]. [Women] used to be shackled in the household. She [TCM] was agile, wherever she went. There were religious ceremonies and so on. I have known TCM for a long time. Especially in Singkawang there are many temples. She has been attending ceremonies all the time. The place where Chinese people gather is during the commemoration day in the temple. Indeed, if you want to introduce yourself to the traditional Chinese community, you have to go to temples (Author’s interview with AC, a prominent Tri Dharma figure, 20 December 2017).

TCM’s strong social capital of networks among Chinese Indonesians in Singkawang, West Kalimantan, and beyond can be seen from the large numbers of congratulations posters sent to TCM from various networks of Chinese clans, businesswomen, businessmen, and non-Chinese individuals to TCM that were displayed in front of the Singkawang’s Mayor office as well as along the street, which I observed in Singkawang on 19 December 2017. At this stage, her ability to build networks was really crucial in her political rise and victory. Here again, I agree with Aspinall’s observation (2011) that ethnicity alone is not a trump card and that what really counts is the ability to membangun jaringan (build networks), as in TCM’s case.

Having strong Chinese social networks, what was TCM’s strategy in the 2017 direct local election? Was the ethnic identity card being played in these elections? I agree with Freedman (2003) who said that ethnic identity is formed from internal dynamics within a group, is shaped and affected by the larger social, political, and cultural environment in which a group lives, and that ethnic identity in Indonesia has long been a political category. In Singkawang, the Chinese are in the majority followed by Malays, Dayaks, the Buginese, the Madurese, and the Batak. Historically in West Kalimantan, the Chinese often entered into a coalition with Dayaks (You, 2015), whereas the Chinese and Malays have long had conflicting relationships in relation to the struggle over the gold mining territory.

In the 2017 direct local election, TCM needed to find a pair as her vice-district head candidate to create an ethnic balance. It has to be understood that ethnic politics in the post-New Order period, as Tanasaldy said, has been colored by ethnic “power sharing” (Tanasaldy, 2007, p. 371). According to Tanasaldy, district head elections after 1999 (at that time the election of a local government head was still conducted by members of the Regional House of Representatives) had been largely peaceful, mostly because of conscious power sharing between Malays and Dayaks, the two ethnic groups having reached an understanding of their respective ethnic domains (Tansaldy, 2007).

TCM’s political context differs from Tanasaldy’s observation, which was made under the previous Law No. 22 of 1999 on Regional Government in which local government heads were elected by the members of the Regional House of Representatives. Her rise has been under the new Law No. 32 of 2004 and the current Law No. 10 of 2016 in which the local government heads have been directly elected by the local people since 2005. In this new political context, TCM still had to find an ethnic balance. She chose a Singkawang man named Irwan, a local bureaucrat, chief of the FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan dan Putra Putri TNI-Polri, Communication Forum of the Sons and Daughters of the Retired Army and Police). Irwan is a Bugis-Malay Muslim, young and popular, and has strong networks among Malay youth and the ethnic Chinese. Irwan’s wife is from Madura, and his father is a former Military Rayon Commander in the sub-district of Tujuh Belas, which is now called South Singkawang, in which the majority of the population are Chinese Indonesians. As his father had many Chinese friends, Irwan is also familiar with and has many Chinese Indonesian friends in Singkawang (Author’s interview with JP, a prominent Malay cultural figure and a member of Irwan’s winning team in Singkawang, 20 December 2017). JP added that, while TCM has for many years developed strong networks with Chinese Indonesians in Singkawang and gained their trust, Irwan has many years of relationship with not only Bugis-Malay but also Chinese youth. Thus, the combination of TCM and Irwan created a strong social capital of Chinese–Malay networks that became a competitive advantage none of their competitors could match. At this stage, the ability of TCM and her team to build networks that stretch beyond single-ethnicity boundaries has been crucial in her political rise and victory.

HK said that Irwan contributed to TCM’s victory as he attracted Muslim voters, either Bugis or Malay and Chinese Muslim voters (Author’s interview with HK, the former Mayor of Singkawang [2007–2012], 7 December 2017). AC, a Chinese Indonesian man, said that TCM’s close personal relationship with Dayak and Malay figures meant that, in the event of any tension, it could be easily settled (Author’s interview with AC, a prominent figure of Tri Dharma figure, 20 December 2017). Here we can see that the consideration of ethnic identity balancing was being seriously taken into account in TCM’s political rise and victory. Here, Mietzner’s previous observations (2009, p. 277), echoed by Aspinall (2011, p. 304), seem relevant: That Indonesian electorates do not support ethnic exclusivists, because in regions with diverse ethnic populations, most winning candidates are those who appeal “to cross-cultural constituencies instead of relying on support by one ethnic, religious or social group.”

HK, as one of TCM’s campaigners and supporters, said that ethnicity becomes one of the vote-gathering factors while religion does not; this is because not all Chinese people are followers of Confucianism as many of them are Muslims, Catholics, and Buddhists (Author’s interview with HK, a former Mayor of Singkawang (2007–2012), 7 December 2017). He said that although they could not use various Chinese associations formally, as they are non-political organizations, individual prominent figures in various Chinese associations supported TCM (Author’s interview with HK, a former Mayor of Singkawang [2007–2012], 7 December 2017). HK also conducted door-to-door campaigns in the Dayak community in remote areas. HK’s role in consolidating votes from Dayaks for TCM is interesting given that he is Chinese. Historically, Dayaks have had a close relationship with the ethnic Chinese because Dayaks experienced discrimination under the Malay sultanates and Dutch colonialism that prevented them from participating in social activities beyond their own group (Tanasaldy, 2007). In the case of TCM’s political rise, the ethnic Chinese (in this case TCM) and Malays (in this case Irwan) cooperated in the 2015 direct local election, creating an interesting new ethnic collaboration.

This paper’s findings regarding the interplay of ethnicity in politics is not surprising. In a broader picture of post-reformasi Indonesian local politics, Aspinall (2011) concluded that ethnicity (a soft form of ethnic politics) still counts in arenas such as local elections. Tanasaldy noted that the politicization of ethnicity has a long history, especially in West Kalimantan, and has been practiced in particular by the underdog Dayaks rather than by the more powerful Malays (Tanasaldy, 2007). What is new in the rise of TCM in Singkawang is the formation of a new form of collaboration, which implies new ‘power sharing’ between the ethnic Chinese and Malays, as compared to the past where, as noted by Tanasaldy, ethnic political contests in West Kalimantan mainly occurred between Malays and Dayaks (Tanasaldy, 2007). Previously, the ethnic Chinese in West Kalimantan often created coalitions with Dayaks (You, 2015). Now, with the rise of TCM, a new form of coalition has arisen. While previously, during the Old Order and New Order eras, the Chinese in West Kalimantan remained passive in politics and mainly creating coalitions with Dayaks against Malays. Now, in the post-reformasi era, due to the direct local elections, and especially in the case of the political rise of TCM, it is clearly obvious that a shift in power sharing between ethnic groups in West Kalimantan has occurred. The ethnic Chinese have moved forward and are competing with other groups in Singkawang by coalition with the Malays, who are also a strong element to be considered in an ethnic-balance strategy.

By showing the political rise of TCM, this paper adds a new understanding of the shift in ethnic power sharing: Previously occurring mainly between Dayaks and Malays, the post-reformasi era now sees new patterns of ethnic power sharing between the ethnic Chinese and Malays. This is part of the process to create a democratic equilibrium in Singkawang.

I position TCM as a Chinese Indonesian women, following Budianta’s statement (2002, p. 41) “to contextualize Indonesian women’s effort in redefining their gendered roles within a highly volatile transitional climate post-reformasi.” I view TCM’s experience in the context of an assumption that ‘gender politics’ is constantly changing: Where the ‘gender arrangement’ of the appropriate behavior of men and women in society and its cultural context is not static and constantly changes or is being negotiated due to various influences. The definition of the term ‘gender politics’ here refers to the one proposed by Connell (2008, p. 144): “Gender politics is about the steering of the gender order in history. It represents the struggle to have the endless re-creation of gender relations through practice turn out a particular way.” Connell (2008, pp. 3–6) uses the terms gender arrangement or gender order as the dominant patterns of gender arrangements and norms of society. Connell focuses on gender as it is manifested through social relationships, where men and women interact through either thoughts or actions that constantly produce, reproduce, change, and modify the concept of gender. Some factors such as modernization, political, economic, and social changes play a significant role in influencing changes in women’s narratives in each cultural context. For example, Sen (1998) explores shifts in the narrative discourse of Indonesian women: While in the 1970s the narrative of Indonesian women emphasized the notion of ‘housewife,’ in the 1990s the narrative of ‘working women’ develops as central to the paradigmatic female subject in Indonesian political, cultural, and economic discourses.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century there has been some movement toward a rejection of Confucianism in East Asia (Lee, 2011). However, in the case of TCM, we can see that the ‘gender arrangement’ of Chinese ways of life and beliefs, influenced by Confucianism, are highly patriarchal, positioning men as the core and controller of family while women occupy a subordinate position and have to obey their fathers/husbands/sons (Meij, 2009). The dominance of patriarchy continues in Chinese families: The family line is through the father or the male line, manifesting the centrality of boys in the family compared to girls (Author’s interview with AC, a prominent figure of Tri Dharma in Singkawang, 20 December 2017). Interestingly, AC added that while previously in Singkawang Chinese women were perceived to only have a private role inside their respective households and could not participate outside, this has now changed. Looking at the TCM’s case, she said

It’s the same, that nature [kodrat, ability to do a particular thing, appropriateness and boundary as woman such as giving birth, breastfeed, nurture of children, be a good wives,] can’t be changed […]. Once we are at home we can’t do this and that. If we are outside [of home] we might still be able to do it. If we are at home, our children will tell us what they want. Being inside and outside are different (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017).

As we can see from the above quotation, TCM’s position in the private and public spheres is clearly different. While she has a political and strategic role in the public sphere as Mayor of Singkawang, once she is back home she becomes an ordinary Chinese Indonesian woman who has to obey the gender arrangement of the Chinese ways of life and belief.

Nevertheless, on the issue of TCM’s political rise in the public sphere, AC mentioned that TCM’s rise as the candidate for the post of Mayor of Singkawang positively encouraged other Chinese Indonesian women to stand out and support TCM’s campaign as well. AC felt optimistic about participation of Chinese Indonesian women in Singkawang in the future, saying “there has been a change in the people’s mindset; hopefully in the next five years there will be more women” (Author’s interview with AC, a prominent figure of Tri Dharma in Siangkawang, 20 December 2017).

In Singkawang, by becoming the first Chinese Indonesian female Mayor, TCM has expanded the imagination and practices of Chinese women in Indonesian local politics. This is certainly a new positive narrative of Chinese Indonesian women in Singkawang compared to the previous dominant negative narrative. In their attempts to escape poverty, ordinary Chinese Indonesian women from West Kalimantan, mainly from Singkawang, have gone down the road of arranged marriages abroad. Yentriyani (2005), who studied the transnational marriages of Chinese Indonesian women with Taiwanese men in West Kalimantan, revealed various cases of women being trafficked involving intermediaries. TCM’s response to this phenomenon is to view such women (called amoy) as “family heroes” (pahlawan keluarga) because they often have to marry someone they do not know for the sake of the family’s welfare (Author’s interview with TCM, 19 December 2017). Generally, the picture of Chinese Indonesian women in Singkawang are those who often become mail-order brides for men from Taiwan, China, Malaysia, and Singapore (see http://www.indonesiamatters.com/1663/singkawang/) (Sandel, 2015).

By understanding this general picture, we can see how TCM’s political rise as the first Chinese Indonesian woman in Singkawang has opened new horizons. Chinese Indonesian women in Singkawang are now gradually becoming perceived as being capable of influencing and shaping local politics. Through her life and experiences, TCM has enriched our understanding of the contemporary new portrait of a Chinese Indonesian women’s narrative, especially in the multi-ethnic city of Singkawang in post-reformasi Indonesia.