

Official Development Assistance and Women's Rights: How Aid Donor Characteristics Affect Women's Rights Improvement in Recipient Countries

Byungwon Woo*

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

Dana Parke

Henry Ford Health System, USA

Abstract

How does official development assistance (ODA) affect women's rights in aid-receiving countries? We argue that ODA allows those donor countries who have more respect for women's rights and who have the intention of spreading the norm of gender equality to successfully influence recipient countries, and thus improve women's rights in aid-recipient countries. We argue that this is possible because aid is equipped with technical assistance, donor conditionality, and donor-recipient collaborative projects that can be tailored to address a specific policy objective and that are ripe with opportunities for transfers of technical know-how and synergistic exchanges of local and global norms. We further contend that the effect of foreign aid on the improvement of women's rights is conditional on donors' respect for women's rights at home: foreign aid from countries with more equal women's rights has a stronger positive effect than that from countries with less equal women's rights. We illustrate the plausibility of our theoretical argument in the context of a case of aid projects in Bangladesh and use statistical analysis to test our argument more systematically. We show that aid in general, and aid from France and the Nordic countries - those with better provision of women's rights at home among major aid donors - in particular exert positive effects on improving women's rights in recipient countries from 1981 to 2011, after controlling for political, socio-economic, and regional factors.

Key words

Official Development Assistance (ODA), foreign aid, women's rights, rights diffusion, country-of-origin effect

* Corresponding Author

Introduction

Women's rights have experienced a slow yet steady improvement over the past few decades. According to the CIRI dataset, the most comprehensive human rights dataset available to date, women's political rights have gradually improved from the worldwide average score of 1.45 in 1981, to 1.62 in 1990, 1.86 in 2000, and 2.01 in 2010.¹ This is on a 0 to 3 point scale, with 0 indicating that women's political rights are not guaranteed in law and 3 indicating that women's political rights are guaranteed in law and well enforced in practice. Thus, as of 2010, women's political rights with the global mean score of 2 are on average guaranteed in law but still moderately prohibited in practice. A similar pattern exists for women's economic rights – which account for a diverse set of measures including equal pay for equal work, equality in hiring and promotion, right to dangerous jobs including police and military, and freedom from sexual harassment in the workplace – as women's economic rights have experienced a steady progression, albeit at a much slower pace. The worldwide average score for women's economic rights in 1981 was 1.19 and it had only improved to 1.42 in 2010.

While the global average scores for women's political and economic rights have been on a steady rise, there is also a considerable variation in both the level and the pace of improvement. In 1981, out of 132 countries where women's political rights data is available, 15 countries scored 0, 46 countries scored 1, 68 scored 2, and only 3 scored 3. The topography of women's political rights looks much different in 2011, when out of 191 countries only 21 scored 1, an overwhelming majority of 140 countries scored 2, and a sizable number of countries, 30, scored 3. As one can expect, some countries experienced a larger improvement than others. Among South American countries, for instance, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Argentina experienced at least two points improvement in women's political rights between 1981 and 2011, while Brazil, Panama, and Guatemala experienced little progress during the same time period. Similarly, among Asia-Pacific countries, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Thailand have made steady progress towards better women's political rights, while Papua New Guinea,

¹ Average scores are calculated by the authors using the women's political rights variable in the CIRI dataset.

Myanmar, and Pakistan have experienced little progress and even occasional regress. So why have some countries witnessed a larger improvement in women's rights in the past three decades while others have stagnated?

In this paper, we focus on the positive economic incentives that foreign countries proffer and specifically explore how official development assistance (ODA or foreign aid) might affect women's rights in aid recipient countries. Building on recent scholarship on the spread of gender quotas and improvement of women's rights, we argue that ODA should exert a positive effect on women's rights. We identify ODA as a bilateral mechanism through which an emerging global norm of gender equality diffuses from donors to aid-receiving developing countries. On average, major aid donor countries maintain higher scores of women's rights and their aid agencies often openly declare that improving women's rights in recipient countries is a major goal of their aid programs and projects. We reason that bilateral aid allows major donors with a strong preference of spreading the norm of gender equality to effectively translate their preference into actual policy changes in recipient countries. Bilateral foreign aid does so via three different mechanisms: first, through technical assistance that fosters know-how transfers from donors to recipients; second, through practices of explicit aid conditionality since donors can use policy reforms as a condition for bilateral foreign aid, and thus directly influence a recipient government's domestic policies toward women's rights; and third, through collaborative projects between donors' and recipients' governmental and non-governmental agencies that allow for exchanges of local and global norms, which in turn can empower advocates of women's rights in both donor and recipient countries. These projects also can be specifically tailored to achieve a certain normative policy objective such as improving women's status. Thus, we expect that ODA in general should have a positive effect on women's rights improvement in aid receiving countries.

More innovatively, we argue that the effect of ODA on women's rights improvement is dependent on the level of women's rights in a donor country's home: when a donor has better women's rights at home, the effect of ODA from the country should be more positive than aid from a country with worse women's rights. This is because the causal mechanisms we specify above should apply especially when a donor country maintains better women's rights: those countries with better women's rights will prioritize improving women's rights in recipient countries as a goal of foreign

aid and better utilize the above mechanisms by devising and promoting effective policy measures, scheming better monitoring of implementation, and encouraging collaborative projects.

We systematically evaluate our theoretical argument using statistical analysis. Focusing on women's political rights that have experienced most progress and are often emphasized by Western donors, we report that foreign aid in general has a positive effect on improving women's rights, and foreign aid in particular from the Nordic countries and France, the countries with the best women's rights among major donors, has a more positive effect on the improvement of women's rights in recipient countries than aid from other major donors, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we briefly review extant research on women's rights and foreign aid. In Section III, we detail our theoretical argument. In section IV, we run ordered logit models and discuss the results. Section V concludes with our discussion of the policy implications from our findings.

Literature Review

Studies of women's rights advancement have largely focused on women's political rights, especially on specific measures such as women's right to vote, right to join political parties, and right to be represented in national legislative and executive political offices. Existing studies examine both domestic factors and international influence as determining factors of women's enfranchisement and worldwide diffusion of gender quotas, although the balance seems to favor international influence.

Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan (1997) show that women's suffrage was acquired through domestic social movements before 1930, but since 1930, international factors have played a more prominent role in spreading women's suffrage. They also emphasize national independence as a window of opportunity for advocates of women's suffrage. Moving from the right to vote to the right to be represented in the national political arena, Krook (2006) advances the argument that gender quotas are most effectively diffused by transnational sharing of international norms through international imposition, transnational emulation, international tipping, and international blockage. Regional advocacy networks and INGOs can mobilize and advo-

cate more specific kinds of women's rights and the United Nations or other international or regional organizations provide a forum for such advocacy (Joachim, 2003; Adams & Kang, 2007). Tripp and Kang (2008) show that countries with gender quotas have higher rates of female legislative representation than those without such quotas. They show that neither democracy nor religion has anything to do with increased female representation, but rather that the level of economic development does. Focusing on international incentives, Bush (2011) explores specific mechanisms through which the global diffusion of quotas for women occurs. She posits that the diffusion can occur through democracy-promoting peace operations by the United Nations, international election monitoring, and bilateral foreign aid.

Focusing more broadly on women's political, economic, and social rights using the CIRI dataset, scholars have examined the nexuses between globalization and women's rights on the one hand and between international interventions and women's rights on the other. Richards and Gelleny (2007) find that economic globalization is linked to improvement of women's status, although the relationship varies by types of women's status and by era. Neumayer and De Soysa (2011) explore specific measures of economic globalization, trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and their links to women's rights, and argue that not only total volume of trade and FDI but also with whom one country trades or from whom it sources its finance affects women's status. They find that countries who have trade partners with better women's standing are likely to experience improvement of women's rights but that the relationship is much weaker for FDI. Investigating the link between foreign policies and women's rights, Drury and Peksen (2014) show that imposed economic sanctions have a negative impact especially on women's well-being in sanctioned countries because of their vulnerable social status. Peksen (2012) suggests that the negative effect of foreign security policies can be mitigated by IOs. He shows that while unilateral American military interventions have negative consequences on women's rights in intervened countries, multilateral interventions operated through IOs have positive effects on women's rights.

We hope to contribute to the recent development of scholarly inquiries on the relationship between various external factors and women's rights improvement. Here we focus on the influence of ODA on women's rights improvement, and thus a brief survey of foreign aid literature is in order. As the foreign aid literature is vast and diverse, we try to focus only on

studies from which our theoretical argument is motivated.

Foreign aid is disbursed for many different reasons. A seminal study by Alesina and Dollar (2000) shows that bilateral foreign aid is not only disbursed for economic development, but also for political and strategic reasons. Many European countries, for instance, disburse more foreign aid to former colonies, whereas the United States prefers to give aid to its allies, especially in the Middle East, including Egypt and Israel. Bermeo (2010) chimes in with a similar note, showing that donor countries tend to disburse more aid to those with more sound domestic institutions and strategic ties. Focusing on donor characteristics, Lu and Breuning (2014) demonstrate that better women's political representation in national offices is associated with a donor state's increased generosity.

Foreign aid, in part because it is disbursed for many different reasons, affects not only economic growth (Collier, 2006; Bearce & Tirone, 2010), but also state capacity (Goldsmith, 2001), quality of governance (Brautigam & Knack, 2004), and democratization (Dunning, 2004; Wright 2009; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Nielsen & Nielson, 2010; Bermeo, 2011) to name just a few.

Democratization in particular has received much scholarly attention in recent years. Most recent studies tend to avoid sweeping generalizations on the relationship between aid and democratization; rather they often propose conditions under which the relationship is positive. Dunning (2004), for instance, argues that the effect of foreign aid on democratization is positive when a donor's strategic interest does not interfere and empirically demonstrates that after the Cold War, the effect of foreign aid on democratization has been positive with a decreased strategic interest of the Western donor s.² Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2010) argue that democratization is less likely when a leader with a smaller coalition receives free resources such as foreign aid. Wright (2009) similarly argues that a dictator's propensity to allow democratization is contingent on his or her coalition size: when his or her coalition size is large enough to make him or her likely to stay in power even after transition, he or she is more likely to allow democratization especially when being incentivized with foreign aid. More recent

² A similar argument has been made with regards to the linkage between economic growth and foreign aid. Bearce and Tirone (2010) show that foreign aid is effective in promoting growth when a donor's strategic interest does not interfere with the original intent of foreign aid.

studies warn of considering strategic selection of recipient countries when evaluating the effects of foreign aid. For instance, Nielsen and Nielson (2010) demonstrate that democracy aid tends to flow to countries that are most likely to make a democratic transition in the first place; thus, after accounting for the selection of recipients, democracy aid is largely ineffective in promoting democracy in recipient countries. Bermeo (2010) is more optimistic about the effect of foreign aid on democratization. What distinguishes her study from other research on the linkage between foreign aid and democratization is that she differentiates between aid from democratic donors and aid from nondemocratic donors and argues that democratic donors use aid to encourage democratic transition. This is a novel approach: donor characteristics play a role; consequently, she shows that the source of aid does indeed matter in that aid from democratic donors has a more positive effect on democratic transition.

Theoretical Argument: Better Women's Rights at Home to Better Rights Abroad

While the above literature demonstrates that several factors can influence the level of women's rights in developing countries, we advance an alternative argument to explain this phenomenon: women's rights improvement is influenced by bilateral foreign aid. We further contend, building on Bermeo (2010), that women's rights improvement depends on women's rights status in the donors from whom the foreign aid originates.

International norms diffuse through many different mechanisms. For instance, norms diffuse through socialization in international organizations (Risse & Sikkink, 1999; Johnston, 2001; Greenhill, 2010). Alternatively, international norms can diffuse through bilateral interactions. Recent studies on diffusion of labor and women's rights demonstrate that the rights of a country are influenced by its trading partners (Greenhill, Mosley, & Prakash, 2009; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2011). Similarly, it is also surveyed above that the spread of gender quotas and democracy can occur through bilateral foreign aid (Bermeo, 2010; Bush, 2011).

We propose that an emerging and maturing norm of gender equality can be diffused through ODA, similar to the mechanism in play to spread the more specific gender quotas. We posit this based on two propositions: 1) donor countries who already accept the norm of gender equality will at-

tempt to push for a similar progress in recipient countries; and 2) aid can be an effective “conveyor belt” to transfer donor intent to recipients’ policy changes.

With the more accepted norm of gender equality in donor countries, donor countries are more willing to push for women’s rights improvement in aid recipient countries. As we demonstrate below, most of the major aid donors maintain a relatively higher level of women’s political, economic, and social rights, with a probable exception of Japan, and these countries try to export the norm to other countries. Among the top aid donors we include in our analysis, all but Japan list promoting gender equality in political, economic, and social affairs as a key goal for their aid in their international development/aid agencies’ mission statements.

Table 1.
Historic Averages of Women’s Political and Economic Rights of Major Donors: 1981-2011³

Country	Women’s Political Rights	Women’s Economic Rights
United Kingdom	1.77	2.10
United States	1.90	2.23
Japan	1.97	1.13
France	2.10	2.19
Germany	2.64	2.36
Denmark	2.77	2.16
Sweden	2.87	2.55
Norway	2.87	2.23
Finland	3.00	2.52

Source: Cingranelli & Richards (1999)

Table 1 displays the historic averages of women’s political and economic rights in major donor countries. As one can see, they are generally much higher than the global averages. The historic global averages of women’s political and economic rights fall around 1.7 for political rights and 1.3 for

³ Women’s Social Rights are excluded from the analysis for too many missing observations. Historical averages are calculated by the authors.

economic rights. With the exception of Japan, the UK, and the US, all major donors score higher than 2 for political rights and with the exception of Japan, all donor countries surveyed above score higher than 2 for women's economic rights.

The major donors do not shy away from actively promoting women's rights overseas. Table 2 summarizes the support of the top donor countries' aid agencies for women's political, economic and social rights. This information was obtained from the "mission statements" and "areas of work" sections of the different aid agencies' websites. The data was coded positively if there was a clear mention of support for women's rights or a current project for women's rights; if this was absent, the data was coded negatively.

Table 2.
Support for Women's Rights by Country⁴

Aid Agency of a Country	Support for Women's Political Rights	Support for Women's Economic Rights	Support for Women's Social Rights
Japan (JICA)	No	No	No
United Kingdom (DFID)	No	Yes	Yes
United States (USAID)	Yes	Yes	Yes
France (AFD)	No	Yes	Yes
Germany (BMZ)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sweden (SIDA)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Denmark (DANIDA)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Finland (FINIDA)	Yes	Yes	Yes
Norway (NORAD)	No	Yes	Yes

With the exception of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), all international development agencies of major donors actively advocate support for women's political, economic, and social rights. The US,

⁴ Source: Data analyzed by the authors from the following websites: <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/>; <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development>; <https://www.usaid.gov/>; www.afd.fr/lang/en/home; <https://www.bmz.de/en/>; <http://www.sida.se/English/>; <http://um.dk/en/danida-en/>; <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49312&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>; <https://www.norad.no/en/front/>

Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland actively promote all aspects of women's rights. The UK, Norway, and France do so for all but women's political rights. In comparison, JICA's main mission statement does not contain specific objectives regarding women's rights. We suspect that this lack of emphasis on women's rights by JICA is not a coincidence. Historical averages of Japanese women's political and economic rights are 1.97 and 1.13 respectively, far worse than any other major donors included in the analysis; thus Japan tends not to focus overtly on the improvement of women's rights overseas. A recent study by Brysk and Mehta (2014) confirms our proposition. They find that "more sexually equal countries are more likely to support ... international measures to combat gender and sexual orientation discrimination, and more and higher quality development assistance (p.1)."

Given the establishment of the majority of aid donors' intention to support the improvement of women's rights in recipient countries, bilateral foreign aid can be an effective tool for norm diffusion, because aid is not just free or cheap money for recipients. Collier (2006), comparing oil resources and foreign aid, suggests reasons why foreign aid can be more effective in achieving policy changes in a country. Among his four reasons, three are more pertinent here. First, foreign aid often comes in the form of technical assistance as opposed to or in addition to financial assistance to governments. Donors for instance often provide technical assistance to promote institutional reforms, to train bureaucrats, and to assist economic reforms, and thus have a more direct effect on policy outcomes in recipient countries. Second, donors often condition their aid on certain policy reforms, thus providing more incentives for the recipient government to make donor-desired policy changes. Leaving aside democratic accountability of such foreign pressure, this conditional incentive structure allows more effective policy changes in recipient countries, especially when policy changes are internationally accepted, less politically controversial, and less onerous from a recipient country's perspective. While there are few studies conducted on how effective such conditionality actually is, at least Eichler and Glassman (2008) show that conditionality in performance-based lending is effective in health sector aid. And third, foreign aid often involves collaboration between governmental and non-governmental agencies from both donor and recipient countries for a particular project. These collaborations on donor-funded projects can diffuse due process and encourage the

exchange of knowledge – technical knowledge and global norms from a donor to a recipient and local knowledge and norms from a recipient to a donor. It might also carry a positive externality of empowering and transforming civil society in both donor and recipient countries, which can strengthen voices of women's rights advocates and catalyze more effective project planning and implementation.

Once aid arrives in a recipient country, we posit that indirect and direct mechanisms can make an improvement in women's rights. First, donor foreign aid can indirectly improve the level of women's rights by improving infrastructure, social services, and organizations that grant women better access into the economic and political sectors. Aid also can empower civil society and local NGOs in recipient countries that target women's rights specifically or indirectly through economic development, healthcare, education, and other social services that have an impact on women. Donor-recipient collaborative projects not only empower NGOs in recipient countries but also those in donor countries by endowing more local norms and knowledge necessary to have more effective input on aid projects. In turn, NGOs and civil society in donor countries can have a larger voice, allowing them to channel their demands through their aid agencies in the future. Secondly, donor countries can directly condition foreign aid packages, mandating a specific increase in the level of women's rights in return for financial compensation. These direct policy conditions can make more immediate and decisive policy changes that will benefit women's rights in recipient countries.

It is also conceivable that aid might indirectly improve women's rights in recipient countries via economic development. While the net effect of foreign aid on economic development is still largely debated in empirical studies of effectiveness of foreign aid, it is possible that aid, under certain circumstances, can allow better economic development. This development then can help those who are previously marginalized, most notably women. Thus, aid can also indirectly contribute to the improvement of women's rights.

In a nutshell, foreign aid, or at least some portion of it, is purposed to promote women's rights in recipient countries. We show that donors with better women's rights at home often state explicitly that they want to push for the betterment of women's rights in recipient countries. We also argue that foreign aid can be an effective tool to realize such a donor's intentions,

as its flows are accompanied by technical assistance, policy conditionality, and collaboration opportunities between governmental and non-governmental agencies in both donor and recipient countries. Based on our argument, we propose the following hypothesis: *Women's Rights Improving Aid Hypothesis: The more foreign aid a country receives, the more likely the country is to improve its women's rights.*

In addition to the *Women's Rights Improving Aid Hypothesis*, we further contend that foreign aid from donors with better women's rights has more positive effects on promoting women's rights in recipient countries. The causal mechanisms laid out above imply a role for the donor in shaping foreign aid packages. Building on studies that emphasize donors or investment and trade partners' characteristics on human rights consequences (Greenhill, Mosley, & Prakash, 2009; Bermeo, 2011; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2011), we contend that the effect of foreign aid is dependent on donor characteristics. This aligns with recent literature on gender equality policies in foreign aid: Lu & Breuning (2014) demonstrate that women's representation in the parliament and cabinet is positively associated with a donor state's generosity.

Women's rights have been a growing international norm over the past several decades, similar to that of democratic governance in the post-Cold War period. Many developed countries (of whom many are also major aid donors) have adopted the promotion of women's rights within their own borders as documented above. However, the extent of women's rights being protected domestically differs between countries, with some donors immersing themselves more wholeheartedly in the domestic promotion of women's rights than others. As women's rights have gained internal and international legitimacy, many of these more developed countries wish to spread this norm to other countries.

Given that Bashevkin (2014) finds that women decision-makers were more likely to express pro-feminist rhetoric, it is plausible to argue that countries that have more wholeheartedly adopted women's rights at home will be more vocal in their attempt to promote women's rights abroad. While this can be accomplished through political rhetoric and the exchange of ideas at international conferences, the major way such countries are able to concretely promote women's rights abroad is through their development aid agencies, because of the mechanisms listed above where foreign aid directly and indirectly affects women's rights. It is thus reasonable to

assume that the aid agencies of countries with higher domestic demand for women's rights will be both vocal in their promotion of women's rights abroad, as well as more effective, in that there will be an increase in the levels of women's rights in recipients. This argument is applicable despite whether foreign aid itself promotes women's rights directly, or if donors are rewarding countries that take steps towards improving women's rights. Both of these scenarios reflect a case where donors use limited aid resources to promote women's rights.

This is in contrast to donor countries that do not have as high of levels of women's rights domestically. Such countries place less emphasis on the promotion of women's rights. Because it is not a domestic necessity, these countries will not spend the resources to promote this norm abroad. Consequently, we do not expect to see their aid agencies promote women's rights nor for the levels of women's rights in their recipients to increase as much as from donors with higher levels of women's rights. A donor country will, however, be susceptible to criticisms of applying double standards or being hypocritical when it has mediocre women's rights itself yet promotes women's rights abroad.

This leads us to our hypothesis that donor characteristics do matter in determining recipient outcomes: *Better Women's Rights Home to Better Rights Abroad Hypothesis: Foreign aid from donor countries with more equal women's rights will have a stronger positive effect on the level of recipient's women's rights than aid from countries with less equal women's rights.*

Empirical Analysis

Illustrative Case: SIDA and Bangladesh

Sweden, as a member of the "Nordic Council," is one of top foreign aid donors and has strong levels of women's rights. Its aid agency, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), accordingly espouses promotion of women's rights actively.

Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971; at its independence, women's rights in Bangladesh were very limited. The biggest problem that women faced was the high birth rate (in 1962, 6.7 children per woman) accompanied by a high child mortality rate (24%) (Rosling, 2009). This high population growth seemed to have no end in sight, partic-

ularly as it was coupled with the country's severe poverty and ongoing development crises. However, over the last several decades, Bangladesh has undergone what Hans Rosling (2009) terms a "miracle" for women's rights: in 2011 fertility rates were at 2.2 children per woman and the child mortality rate was at 4.4% (World Bank, 2013). Most striking is that these lower figures are not only due to improvement in urban areas; instead, it is in the rural areas where agriculture dominates that children have received better health care and education, and women have become more empowered (Rosling, 2009). The improvement is not as drastic when we look at the CIRI data, but we still observe that Bangladesh has experienced gradual enhancement of women's rights between early 1980s and 2011. Between 1982 and 1985, Bangladesh scored 0s for women's economic, political, social rights. By 2011, the scores improve to 1 for economic and 2 for political rights with the score for social rights missing.

Bangladesh's legislation reflects its solid commitment towards women's rights. In 1984 Bangladesh ratified a key international treaty, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), albeit with reservations on four articles of which two were later withdrawn. The government has also adopted many women-friendly laws, including the Women's Development Policy, the Women and Child Repression Suppression Act, and the Domestic Violence (Prevention and Protection) Act, among others.⁵

SIDA's work in Bangladesh has helped contribute to this steady improvement in women's status. In the year 2012 alone, SIDA gave 287 million SEK (approximately 45 million USD) to Bangladesh. 77 percent of this annual budget is spent on social and institutional projects that directly benefit women's standing in Bangladesh. Of the 287 million SEK provided to Bangladesh in 2012, close to half of the budget was provided for health (137 million SEK), another 15 percent was spent toward education (57 million SEK), and about 10 percent was devoted for democracy, human rights, and gender equality (27 million SEK).

This budget composition presents a sharp contrast to activities conducted in Bangladesh by JICA, the Japanese aid agency whose domestic women's

⁵ Citizens' Initiatives on CEDAW, Bangladesh (CIC-BD), "International CEDAW Day 2015: Withdrawal of Reservation," *The Daily Star*, September 3, 2015. Retrieved January 10, 2016, from <http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/withdrawal-reservation-136687%20>

rights provision is one of the worst among developed countries. Out of more than 90 major projects listed on the JICA's webpage on Bangladesh, only 17 projects are on health and education.⁶ The vast majority of major projects by JICA are concentrated on agriculture and rural development, power and energy, and transportation infrastructure development. While these other projects would certainly improve women's well-being in Bangladesh, the immediate effect of these projects would be much more muted, especially compared to SIDA's many directly targeted and specifically tailored projects.

SIDA devotes special attention to human rights, especially those of women, in addressing the education and health sectors in Bangladesh. SIDA in Bangladesh prioritizes improving living conditions for the poor, with particular emphasis given on women and children. Accordingly, numerous health and education projects put the emphasis on women and girls, including health nutrition, urban primary health care, a sexual and reproductive health and rights program, primary education development program and the basic education for urban working children (SIDA, 2009). SIDA specifically aims to offer "increased access to and improved quality of primary education for children living in poverty, with a particular focus on girls (Nordstrom, 2009)."

While improving women's access to health and education has direct effects on women's social rights and indirect longer-term effects on women's economic and political rights, SIDA also has implemented programs meant to directly address women's political rights. Emphasis on democracy and good governance is accomplished through SIDA's direct support to civil society organizations in Bangladesh. One example is the support given to Steps Towards Development, an organization that seeks to improve women's direct political participation in both national government positions and local committees and organizations (SIDA, 2012). SIDA also supports women's economic rights through programs such as Sabalamby Unnayan Samity, which helps local women's groups to obtain microloans to start businesses and continue their education. One individual who benefited, Fahima Begum Rupa, was able to buy cows with a microloan for revenue, start her own women's group in her village, finish her studies and become

⁶ The list was retrieved February 12, 2014 from http://www.jica.go.jp/bangladesh/english/activities/c8h0vm00004b20nh-att/project_list.pdf

a pre-school teacher, and be elected to the municipal council (SIDA, 2012), showing marked improvement in her political, economic and social rights. While these are individual anecdotes, when these beneficiaries aggregate, the overall effect can be far-reaching.

In sum, SIDA seems to give special attention to projects to improve women's rights in aid recipient countries. While we do not claim that the improvement of women's well-being in Bangladesh for the past few decades has been brought about exclusively by aid from donors with better women's rights at home, this case suggests that aid from such donors would have a more immediate positive effect on improvement of women's rights in recipient countries than aid from donor countries with mediocre women's rights at home.

Statistical Analysis

Now we turn to statistical analysis to evaluate our hypotheses. To test the relationships between foreign aid and improvement of women's rights in general and between origins of foreign aid and improvement of women's rights in particular, we run a series of statistical models and report the results.

Dependent Variable

We use women's rights data from the CIRI dataset (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999, 2013). CIRI is a comprehensive human rights dataset and includes scores for women's political, economic, and social rights on a country/year basis. The data is available from 1981 to 2011. While we are interested in all dimensions of women's rights, we focus here on women's political rights for practical purposes. First, women's political rights have witnessed the most drastic improvement among the three dimensions of women's rights included in the dataset. In our dataset, the average of women's political rights among those countries that receive foreign aid has improved from 1.57 in the 1980s to 1.73 in the 1990s to 1.99 in the 2000s. In comparison, both women's economic and social rights have progressed very little in aid receiving countries, if at all. The average of women's economic rights among aid receiving countries has improved little from 1.32 in the 1980s to 1.31 in the 1990s to 1.34 in the 2000s. Similarly the average

of women's social rights has moved from 1.20 in the 1980s to 1.26 in the 1990s to 1.30 in the 2000s. Given this slight progress in women's economic and social rights, we focus on improvement of women's political rights.⁷ Second, women's political rights cover the most comprehensive observations with the fewest missing observations in the dataset. Third, Western donors often recognize civil and political rights as more basic human rights, and thus might prioritize the promotion of political rights. In comparison, economic and social rights are more politically controversial even among some major donor countries. Thus, the area of women's political rights is the most likely case where we might observe the positive effect of foreign aid.

Women's political rights, WOPOL, include a number of rights relating to political participation. These include women's rights to vote, to run for a political office, to hold government positions, to join political parties, and to petition politicians. The variable ranges from 0 to 3. A country is coded 0 if women's political rights were not guaranteed by law, coded 1 if women's political rights were guaranteed in law but severely prohibited in practice, coded 2 if women's political rights were guaranteed in law but were still moderately prohibited in practice, and coded 3 if women's political rights were guaranteed in both law and practice (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999, 2013).

Independent Variable

We use bilateral official development assistance of the top five donors – the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan – and the Nordic Council members (Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) as our main independent variables. The data is downloaded using the OECD Query Wizard for International Development Assistance.⁸ The downloaded data record actual aid disbursement amounts of bilateral official development assistance between a donor and a recipient in a given year in millions of current U.S. dollars. We use actual disbursement as opposed to aid commitment data as we are theorizing about the effect of ac-

⁷ This small variation in the variables - women's economic and social rights - make it impractical to run statistical analysis, because this would mean little variation in the dependent variables.

⁸ <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>

tually disbursed and implemented aid projects and programs on women's rights. Given that the data is heavily skewed to the right, we take a natural log of each observation, following a common practice in foreign aid literature.⁹ For the first analysis, we use the sum of all aid. For the second analysis, we disaggregate aid by donor countries and examine the individual effect of aid from each donor.

Control Variables

Table 3.
Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Log Total Aid	3113	14.06	9.31	0.00	43.90
Log American Aid	3113	2.43	1.90	0.00	7.99
Log British Aid	3113	1.36	1.53	0.00	8.07
Log French Aid	3113	2.07	1.64	0.00	7.61
Log Japanese Aid	3113	2.37	1.81	0.00	7.40
Log German Aid	3113	2.41	1.51	0.00	7.45
Log Nordic Aid	3113	3.42	3.87	0.00	18.45
Polity	3013	0.75	6.78	-10.00	10.00
Internal Conflict	3113	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00
Log GDP per Capita	3012	8.04	1.10	5.52	11.21
Trade (% of GDP)	2992	77.85	47.79	6.32	460.47
Asia	3113	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Sub-Saharan Africa	3113	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00
North Africa, Middle East	3113	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00

We control for four variables primarily. First we control for regime type in order to account for political liberalization or the level of democracy. We use a widely used Polity score (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011). Polity measures the level of democracy in -10 to 10 scale where -10 denotes absolute autocracy and 10 denotes full democracy. Second, we control for one country's GDP per capita in order to control of the level of economic

⁹ We excluded observations with negative aid and added 1 to all observations to take a log.

development. The data comes from the World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2013). We take a log of GDP per capita as the data is skewed to the right. Third, in line with recent studies emphasizing the effect of economic globalization, we include trade as percentage of GDP variable. The data also comes from the World Development Indicator (World Bank, 2013). Finally, we also control for the existence of internal military conflict. The variable is coded 1 if a country experiences an internal armed conflict with more than 25 battle related deaths. This data comes from the Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset.¹⁰

We also control for regions, given that we would expect different donors have their own regional focus, and regions may exhibit different dynamics of women's rights improvement. We include Asia, North Africa-Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Estimation Techniques

The assembled dataset is time-series, cross-sectional covering 1981 to 2011 and all the countries eligible for development assistance. In order for robustness check, we further limit countries by their income level in order to eliminate those who are receiving aid for more geopolitical reasons. The main findings remain consistent.

Given the TSCS data structure and the ordinal nature of the dependent variable ranging from 0 to 3, we employ ordered logit models for our Analysis 1 and Analysis 2. Following best practices that earlier studies dealing with similar data structure employed, we account for temporal dependency in the CIRI data by creating binary variables for each of the four categories and include them in our analysis (Hafner-Burton, 2005; Drury & Peksen, 2014).¹¹ We also try an alternative way of accounting for temporal dependency by simply including the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side and report the result in the appendix. The results are consistent with each other. In order to mitigate simultaneity concern, we lag all time variant independent variables. In Analysis 1, we examine the effect of the total amount of foreign aid on improvement of women's rights, thus test Hypothesis 1. In Analysis 2, we examine the effect of aid from each donor

¹⁰ <http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/3-2005b/>

¹¹ One of these binary variables drops out in actual analysis due to collinearity.

country by including individual aid amount from the top 5 donors and the Nordic Council.

Results

The results presented in Table 4 clearly support our Hypothesis 1. The first column reports coefficients from the analysis and their statistical significance. The second column reports odds ratio to aid substantive interpretation of the variables.

Table 4.
Women's Political Rights Improvement and Total Received Foreign Aid

Women's Political Rights: Ordered Logit Model with Aggregate Aid		
Variable	Coefficient (Standard Errors)	Odds Ratio
Women's Rights (0) t-1	-13.2130** (0.5085)	0.0000**
Women's Rights (1) t-1	-8.8679** (0.3278)	0.0001**
Women's Rights (2) t-1	-4.4610** (0.2894)	0.0116**
Log Total Aid t-1	0.0448** (0.0090)	1.0458**
Democracy t-1	0.0251** (0.0106)	1.0254**
Internal Conflicts t-1	-0.0834 (0.1897)	0.9200
Log Per Capita GDP t-1	0.1946** (0.0937)	1.2148**
Trade (% GDP) t-1	0.0010 (0.0013)	1.0010
Asia	-0.8569** (0.2029)	0.4245**
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.2224 (0.1874)	0.8006
North Africa/Middle East	-1.2763** (0.2217)	0.2791**
Prob > chi2	0.0000	
Pseudo R ²	0.5746	
N	2,992	

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ** denotes $p < 0.05$ and * denotes $p < 0.10$

After controlling for all political, economic, regional factors, and auto-correlation in the dependent variable, the main independent variable, the logged total aid is positive and statistically significant, and thus suggests that an increase of total aid amount a country receives leads to improvement of women's political rights. Given difficulty in interpreting ordered logit models, we report odds ratio next to each coefficient. Since ordered logit models estimate a single equation divided by the ordered level of the dependent variable, odds ratio can be interpreted as, for one unit change in an independent variable, the odds for cases belonging in a group that is greater than any set level that researchers are interested in compared to the odds that cases belonging in a group that is less than or equal to the set level. Thus for instance, one unit increase of total foreign aid one country receives makes the odds of women's political rights being 2 or 3 1.045 times higher than the odds of women's political rights being 0 or 1.¹² Similarly, the same increase in aid makes the odds of women's political rights falling into the highest category of 3 1.045 times higher than the odds of women's political rights being at or below 2.

Among the control variables, we see that the previous year's level of democracy, Polity, exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on women's rights improvement. This suggests that a more democratic country is likely to make improvements in women's rights, as one would expect. Substantively, one unit increase in Polity makes the odds of women's political rights being 2 or 3 1.025 times higher than the odds of women's political rights being 0 or 1. In addition, economic development positively contributes to improvement of women's political rights. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant and substantively, one unit increase of the log of GDP per capita makes the odds of women's political rights being 2 or 3 1.215 times more likely than the odds of women's political rights being 0 or 1.¹³ Neither Internal Conflict nor Trade as percentage of GDP is statistically significant at a conventional level. As one can note, there is very high auto-correlation, as the dummy variables for each level of the dependent variable

¹² One unit increase of the log of total aid from 1 to 2, for instance, translates into about 4.5 million current US dollars. One unit increase of the log of total aid from 2 to 3 translates into about a little less than 13 million current US dollars.

¹³ The mean of the log of GDP per capita (8) approximately translates into \$2,980. One unit decrease from the mean (7) translates into per capital GDP of \$1,096 and one unit increase from the mean (9) translates into per capita GDP of \$8,103.

are statistically significant. There are also very strong regional effects and a country's being situated in Asia and North Africa/Middle East in particular tends to make women's political rights improvement less likely.

Now we move on to the disaggregated analysis. Table 5 reports results with individual donor's aid amounts as the main independent variables. From our theoretical discussion, we expect that foreign aid from countries with better women's political rights, such as the Nordic countries, Germany, and France, will exert a more positive effect on a recipient country's women's political rights improvement than foreign aid from countries with mediocre women's political rights, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan.

The results reported in Table 5 largely support our Hypothesis 2. Controlling for political democratization and economic development and other countries' aid, we find that aid from France and the Nordic countries, the countries with the highest women's political rights granted and practiced at home exerts a positive influence on women's political rights improvement. The lag of the log of French aid is statistically significant at $p < 0.1$ level and positive. Thus the increase in foreign aid is positively associated with better women's political rights in the following year. The odds ratio is approximately 1.1, suggesting that the odds of an increase in women's political rights above a cut point, say 2, is likely if aid from France has increased in a previous year: thus, given our hypothetical cut point, political rights being 2 or 3 is 1.1 times higher if one unit of French aid increases. Similarly, Nordic aid is statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ level and positive, suggesting that the more aid a country receives from Nordic countries, the more likely the country is going to have better women's political rights, after controlling for other political, economic, and geographical variables and autocorrelation. Substantively, the odds ratio is 1.14. This suggests that a one unit increase of Nordic aid increases the odds of women's political rights being 1, 2, or 3 as opposed to 0 1.14 times higher, or the odds of those being 2 or 3 as opposed to 0 or 1 1.14 times higher. In comparison, aid from the U.S., the U.K, and Japan, with lower women's political rights index at home, does not exert a statistically significant effect on women's political rights improvement in aid receiving countries. A surprising case is Germany, with one of the highest scores on women's political rights at home: its aid carries a negative coefficient, albeit not statistically significant.

Table 5.
Women's Political Rights Improvement and Foreign Aid by Donors

Women's Political Rights: Ordered Logit Model with Disaggregate Aid by Donor		
Variable	Coefficient (Standard Error)	Odds Ratio
Women's Rights (0) t-1	-13.1878** (0.5189)	0.0000**
Women's Rights (1) t-1	-8.7714** (0.3370)	0.0002**
Women's Rights (2) t-1	-4.3956** (0.3008)	0.0123**
American Aid t-1	0.0197 (0.0385)	1.0199
British Aid t-1	0.0195 (0.0617)	1.0197
French Aid t-1	0.0946* (0.0518)	1.0992*
Japanese Aid t-1	-0.0119 (0.0493)	0.9882
German Aid t-1	-0.0968 (0.0706)	0.9077
Nordic Aid t-1	0.1327** (0.0273)	1.1419**
Democracy t-1	0.0244** (0.0108)	1.0247**
Internal Conflicts t-1	-0.0778 (0.1922)	0.9251
Per Capita GDP t-1	0.1625* (0.0940)	1.1764*
Trade (% of GDP) t-1	0.0008 (0.0013)	1.0008
Asia	-0.9785** (0.2245)	0.3759**
Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.4111** (0.2019)	0.6629**
North Africa/Middle East	-1.3295** (0.2316)	0.2646**
Prob>Chi2	0.0000	
Pseudo R ²	0.5778	
N	2,992	

Note: Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ** denotes $p < 0.05$ and * denotes $p < 0.10$

As they are in the case in the aggregate analysis, both Polity and GDP per capita logged are statistically significant and positive, implying that more democratic countries and more economically developed countries are more likely to improve their women's political rights. In comparison, both Internal Conflict and Trade as percentage of GDP fail to reach the conventional statistical significance level. All regional dummies are statistically significant and negative, suggesting countries in Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa/Middle East are less likely to have better women's political rights than aid-receiving countries in excluded regions, most notably Latin America. Including other regional variables does not change the findings.

In addition to the analyses reported above, we have conducted extensive robustness checks. First of all, recognizing that aid may take more time than a year to fully make an effect, we add the previous 5 years of aid from each country and use them as alternative main independent variables. In addition, we examine if more aid-dependent countries should behave differently by including only those who would be classified as low income or low middle income countries by the World Bank classification scheme, roughly with per capita income less than \$4100. Third, we employ an alternative way of accounting for temporal dependency by including the lagged dependent variable in the right hand side. These are reported in the Appendix. The main findings remain consistent.

In sum, we report considerable evidence that supports our hypotheses. Aggregate foreign aid helps aid recipient countries improve their women's political rights. In addition, we show that the positive effect of foreign aid on women's political rights improvement hinged on where aid comes from: if aid comes from countries with the best record of women's political rights protection and practices, such as France and the Nordic countries, aid has a strong and positive effect on women's political rights improvement in aid receiving countries; no such positive effect is found when aid comes from countries with a less than stellar record of women's political rights at home, including the U.S., the U.K, and Japan. We argue that this is because countries with the best women's rights records have both the intention and the means to improve women's political rights abroad.

Conclusion

This paper supports the hypotheses that ODA can improve women's

rights, and that donor characteristics matter in determining recipient outcomes. There are a number of contributions that this paper makes to existing studies of women's rights and aid. Most importantly, the present study shows that ODA not only affects specific measures for women's political rights, such as gender quotas, but also affects a broader set of women's rights. In addition, the paper disaggregates aid by donor countries and demonstrates that aid from donors with better women's rights at home exerts a more positive effect on a recipient country's women's rights than aid from countries with mediocre women's rights at home. The study also provides groundwork for future research. For instance, a future research can explore how actual women's political representation in a donor country or the partisanship of a government might affect aid's effects on women's rights improvement of a recipient country.

Normative implications of the research are twofold. On the one hand, women's rights advocates who believe in the universality of such rights would observe that women's rights can be successfully diffused through foreign aid and would encourage donor governments to continue to push for such goals. On the other hand, those who are more sensitive to specific cultural and religious circumstances and who emphasize unique cultural contexts within which one evaluates what women are entitled to, would contend that foreign aid is yet another attempt by Western countries to impose its values on aid dependent countries.

Whichever one's normative take on the conclusion is, there are several policy implications from the research. Most obviously, the current study suggests that in order to make your aid more effective abroad, donor countries need to improve their own women's rights first. This in particular seems to be applicable to the United States and the United Kingdom, who still maintain only average women's political rights yet actively promote women's rights overseas, at least in their rhetoric. Such attempts, however well intended, will not likely work to actually improve women's rights in recipient countries.

References

- Adams, M., & Kang, A. (2007). Regional advocacy networks and the protocol on the rights of women in Africa. *Politics & Gender*, 3, 451-474.
- Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5, 33-63.
- Bashevkin, S. (2014). Numerical and policy representation on the international stage: Women foreign policy leaders in Western industrialized systems. *International Political Science Review*, 35(4), 409-429.
- Bearce, D., & Tirone, D. (2010). Foreign aid effectiveness and the strategic goals of donor governments. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(3), 837-851.
- Bermeo, S. B. (2010). *Development and strategy: Aid allocation in an interdependent world*. Durham, NC: Manuscript, Duke University.
- Bermeo, S. B. (2011). Foreign aid and regime change: A role for donor intent. *World Development*, 39(11), 2021-2031.
- Brautigam, D., & Knack, S. (2004). Foreign aid, institutions, and governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 52(2), 255-285.
- Brysk, A., & Mehta, A. (2014). Do rights at home boost rights abroad? Sexual equality and humanitarian foreign policy. *Journal of Peace Research*, 51(1), 97-110.
- Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2010). Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(4), 936-950.
- Bush, S. S. (2011). International politics and the spread of quotas for women in legislatures. *International Organizations*, 65, 103-137.
- Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (1999). Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(2), 407-418.
- Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (2013). The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset. Retrieved February 15, 2013, from <http://www.humanrightsdata.org>
- Citizens' Initiatives on CEDAW, Bangladesh. (2015, September 3). International CEDAW Day 2015: Withdrawal of reservation. *The Daily Star*. Retrieved January 10, 2016, from <http://www.thedailystar.net/op-ed/politics/withdrawal-reservation-136687%20>
- Collier, P. (2006). Is aid oil?: An analysis of whether African can absorb more aid. *World Development*, 34(9), 1482-1497.
- Denmark's Development Cooperation. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <http://um.dk/en/danida-en>
- Drury, A. C., & Peksen, D. (2014). Women and economic statecraft: The negative

- impact international economic sanctions visit on women. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(2), 463-490.
- Dunning, T. (2004). Conditioning the effects of aid: Cold War politics, donor credibility, and democracy in Africa. *International Organization*, 58, 409-423.
- Eichler, R., & Glassman, A. (2008). *Health systems strengthening via performance-based aid: Creating incentives to perform and to measure results* (Brookings Global Economy and Development Working Paper No. 3).
- Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <https://www.bmz.de/en/>
- Finnish Development Cooperation Organisation. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=49312&contentlan=2&culture=en-US>
- French Development Agency. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <http://www.a fd.fr/lang/en/home>
- Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39(5), 615–637. Dataset retrieved April 11, 2014 from <http://www.prio.no/Data/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Old-Versions/3-2005b/>
- Goldsmith, A. (2001). Foreign aid and statehood in Africa. *International Organization*, 55(1), 123-148.
- Greenhill, B. (2010). The company you keep: International socialization and the diffusion of human rights norms. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(1), 127-145.
- Greenhill, B., Mosley, L., & Prakash, A. (2009). Trade-based diffusion of labor rights: A panel study, 1986–2002. *American Political Science Review*, 103(4), 669-690.
- Hafner-Burton, E. (2005). Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements influence government repression. *International Organization*, 59(3), 593–629.
- Japan International Cooperation Agency. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <http://www.jica.go.jp/english/>
- Japan International Cooperation Agency. (n.d.) JICA's Major Projects in Bangladesh. Retrieved February 12, 2014 from http://www.jica.go.jp/bangladesh/english/activities/c8h0vm00004b20nh-att/project_list.pdf
- Joachim, J. (2003). Framing issues and seizing opportunities: The UN, NGOs and women's rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(2), 247-274.
- Johnston, A. I. (2001). Treating international institutions as social environments. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(4), 487-515.
- Krook, M. L. (2006). Reforming representation: The diffusion of candidate gender quotas worldwide. *Politics & Gender*, 2, 303-327.

- Lu, K., & Breuning, M. (2014). Gender and generosity: Does women's representation affect development cooperation? *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 2(3), 313-330.
- Marshall, M. G., Jaggers, K., & Gurr, T. R. (2011). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800-2011. Retrieved January 29, 2013, from <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>
- Neumayer, E., & De Soysa, I. (2011). Globalization and the empowerment of women: An analysis of spatial dependence via trade and foreign direct investment. *World Development*, 39(7), 1065-1075.
- Nielsen, R., & Neilson, D. (2010). *Triage for democracy: Selection effects in governance aid*. Paper presented at the Department of Government, College of William & Mary, Virginia, United States.
- Nordstrom, B. (2009). *Human rights in the education and health sectors in Bangladesh: The approach of the Swedish Embassy*. Dhaka, Bangladesh: Swedish Embassy.
- Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <https://www.norad.no/en/front/>
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (n.d.). Query Wizard for International Development Statistics. Retrieved April 11, 2014, from <http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/>
- Peksen, D. (2012). Does foreign military intervention help human rights? *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(3), 558-571.
- Ramirez, F., Soysal, Y., & Shanahan, S. (1997). The changing logic of political citizenship: Cross-national acquisition of women's suffrage rights, 1890-1990. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 735-745.
- Richards, D. L., & Gelleny, R. (2007). Women's status and economic globalization. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(4), 855-876.
- Risse, T., & Sikink, K. (1999). The socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices: Introduction. *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*, 66, 1-38.
- Rosling, H. (2009). *Bangladesh miracle*. Gapminder Foundation.
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. (2009). Swedish development cooperation with Bangladesh: A brief overview. Retrieved August 15, 2013 from <http://www.sida.se/English/>
- Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. (2012). Programmes and projects: With power to change. Retrieved August 15, 2013 from <http://www.sida.se/English/>
- Tripp, A. M., & Kang, A. (2008). The global impact of quotas: On the fast track to increased female legislative representation. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(3),

338-361.

- U.K. Department of International Development. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development>
- U.S. Agency for International Development. (n.d.). Retrieved February 14, 2014, from <https://www.usaid.gov/>
- World Bank. (2013). *World development indicators*. Washington DC: The World Bank Group.
- Wright, J. (2009). How foreign aid can foster democratization in authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(3), 552-571.

Biographical Note: **Byungwon Woo** is an assistant professor in the Division of Language and Diplomacy at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, South Korea. Professor Woo's research interests include international organizations, international political economy, and human rights. His research publications have appeared or will appear in various international relations and political science journals including *American Journal of Political Science*, *Economics and Politics*, *International Interactions*, *Journal of Human Rights*, *Korea Observer*, *International Studies Quarterly*, and *Political Science Research and Methods*. E-mail: woo@hufs.ac.kr

Biographical Note: **Dana Parke** is a recent graduate of Oakland University and is a program coordinator at the Global Health Initiative at Henry Ford Health System. As a program coordinator, she is responsible for coordinating various health related projects in Haiti. Ms. Parke's research publications have appeared in *Annals of Global Health*, *European Union External Affairs Review*, *Journal of Developing Societies*, *Malaria Journal*, and *West Indian Medical Journal*. E-mail: danamparke@gmail.com